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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Karim Eley, a prisoner of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania in custody of the State Correctional Institution – 
Rockview, seeks federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (―AEDPA‖), 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  After a joint trial with Lester Eiland and 
Edward Mitchell in the Dauphin County Common Pleas 
Court, a jury convicted Eley of second-degree murder, 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2502(b), robbery, § 3701, and conspiracy to 
commit robbery, § 903, for his role in the murder and robbery 
of Angel DeJesus in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in July 2000.  
Eley now claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to 
support his convictions in violation of the Due Process Clause 
 3 
of the Fourteenth Amendment under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307 (1979); (2) his non-testifying co-defendants‘ 
confessions were admitted against him in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment under Bruton 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Richardson v. Marsh, 
481 U.S. 200 (1987), and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 
(1998); and (3) the trial judge‘s reasonable doubt jury 
instruction reduced the Commonwealth‘s burden of proof in 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment under Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).  
The District Court rejected Eley‘s claims and denied his 
petition.  For the reasons stated below, we will reverse. 
I. 
A. 
 On July 5, 2000, cab driver Angel DeJesus suffered 
multiple fatal gunshot wounds during a robbery while his taxi 
was parked at the intersection of Kittatinny and Hummel 
Streets in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  Before oral argument, 
we requested that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania submit 
a letter specifying the evidence reflected in the record from 
which the jury could have rationally concluded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Karim Eley was guilty of second-
degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery in 
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connection with these crimes.
1
  The Commonwealth directed 
our attention to the evidence we now summarize.
2
 
 Vivian Martinez testified that she remembered that 
DeJesus, her fiancée, had purchased a pouch to hold his 
money a couple of days before July 4, 2000.  She also knew 
that he always kept this money pouch in his taxi while he was 
working.  And she believed that he had about $250.00 in his 
possession around 2:45 a.m. on July 5, 2000. 
 Guadalupe Fonseca testified that he was standing 
outside his home on Kittatinny near the intersection with 
Hummel around 5:00 a.m. on July 5, 2000.  He saw three 
African-American men standing by a taxi, and he did not see 
anyone else in the general area.  He then observed one of the 
three men enter the taxi, and he heard two gunshots.  At the 
same time, he noticed that the other two men remained ―right 
beside‖ the taxi.  App. at 85.  He next watched the first man 
exit the taxi and rejoin the other two men by the side of the 
                                              
1
 Karim Eley declined our invitation to submit a 
response to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania‘s letter. 
2
 Because one of Eley‘s claims is a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, we 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979), and we resolve conflicting inferences in the 
Commonwealth‘s favor, id. at 326. 
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taxi, and he heard a third gunshot.
3
  He finally saw all three 
men depart down Hummel together. 
 Jennifer McDonald testified that after 4:30 a.m. on 
July 5, 2000, she was walking down Hummel towards her 
home on Kittatinny.  She passed by three men, who she 
identified as Eley, Lester Eiland, and Edward Mitchell, 
hanging out in the area of an abandoned house on Hummel 
right before the intersection with Kittatinny.  Eley recognized 
her and did a little dance, and she called him stupid.  She 
turned down Kittatinny, and a taxi passed her travelling 
toward the intersection with Hummel.  About a minute and a 
half later, she heard a slam, and she looked back up Kittatinny 
toward the intersection with Hummel.  She saw the taxi 
stopped at the intersection, but she did not see Eley, Eiland, 
or Mitchell around the taxi.  About five minutes after she 
arrived at her home, she heard police sirens.  She was aware 
that Eley, Eiland, and Mitchell ―hung out‖ at the abandoned 
house.  Id. at 111. 
 Rufus Hudson testified that he was driving around 
Hummel and Kittatinny from 2:30 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. on July 5, 
2000.  Around 3:00 a.m., he identified Eley, Eiland, and 
Mitchell, who were standing at the intersection of Hummel 
and Kittatinny.  Then, around 4:00 a.m., he recognized 
DeJesus in his taxi, which was parked on 13th Street at the 
intersection with Kittatinny.  Later, he again saw DeJesus in 
                                              
3
 At oral argument, the Commonwealth stated that 
about five seconds elapsed between the second and third 
gunshots.  Eley did not rebut this fact. 
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his taxi, which at that time was parked on Hummel at the 
intersection with Kittatinny, and he again noticed Eley, 
Eiland, and Mitchell standing at the intersection of Hummel 
and Kittatinny.  Finally, around 5:00 a.m., he watched the 
defendants run ―real fast‖ away from the taxi, which was still 
parked at the intersection of Hummel and Kittatinny, towards 
the abandoned house.  Id. at 116.  He knew that Eley, Eiland, 
and Mitchell hung out in the area of Hummel and Kittatinny 
near the abandoned house ―every day.‖  Id. at 118. 
 Cindy Baldwin, a Harrisburg Police Bureau forensic 
investigator, testified that on July 5, 2000, she responded to 
the intersection of Hummel and Kittatinny where she 
searched the taxi and collected two shell casings.  She also 
went to the Hershey Medical Center where she gathered 
DeJesus‘s clothing, which did not include any cash, wallet, or 
purse.  She then searched the taxi a second time, and again 
failed to recover any cash, wallet, or purse.  On July 7, 2000, 
she was present at DeJesus‘s autopsy and determined that he 
had been shot three times with a twenty-five caliber gun.  She 
next searched the taxi a third time and discovered a third shell 
casing.  She later learned that all three shell casings may have 
been fired from the same twenty-five caliber gun. 
 Dr. Wayne Ross, a Dauphin County Coroner‘s Office 
forensic pathology expert, testified that on July 7, 2000, he 
performed DeJesus‘s autopsy.  He observed that DeJesus had 
suffered three gunshot wounds to the head and neck area.  He 
opined that DeJesus‘s cause of death was homicide by 
multiple gunshot wounds to the head. 
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 David Lau, a Harrisburg Police Bureau criminal 
investigator, testified that on July 7, 2000, he recovered two 
firearms and three shotguns from the abandoned house.  On 
July 14, 2000, at the Harrisburg Police Bureau, he took a 
statement from Eley.  Eley told him that he had not been in 
the area of Hummel and Kittatinny for the past three weeks.  
Eley specifically said that between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. on 
July 5, 2000, he had been with various acquaintances, friends, 
and family at several locations other than Hummel and 
Kittatinny. 
B. 
 Eley, Eiland, and Mitchell were arrested, charged, and 
jointly tried before three successive juries in the Dauphin 
County Common Pleas Court.  The first two trials ended in 
mistrials.
4
  At the third trial, Eley was convicted of second-
degree murder, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(b), robbery, § 3701, 
and conspiracy to commit robbery, § 903.  He was acquitted 
of conspiracy to commit murder.  Id.  He was sentenced to 
consecutive terms of imprisonment of life without parole for 
                                              
4
 At the first trial, the jury deadlocked.  At the second 
trial, a police witness recited Eley‘s name while reading 
Edward Mitchell‘s confession, in violation of Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
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second-degree murder, seven to twenty years for robbery, and 
four to twelve years for conspiracy to commit robbery.
5
 
 On direct appeal, Eley raised numerous substantive 
issues, including whether (1) there was sufficient evidence to 
convict him; (2) he should have been granted a severance; 
and (3) the trial judge biased the jury by telling it to ignore 
the possibility that someone other than he and his co-
defendants committed the crimes.  The Common Pleas Court 
upheld his convictions on the merits, and a divided panel of 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed his convictions on 
                                              
5
 On direct appeal, Eley challenged the legality of his 
sentence.  Concluding that the Dauphin County Common 
Pleas Court had erred in failing to merge Eley‘s sentences for 
second-degree murder and robbery, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court vacated his sentence.  Commonwealth v. Eley, 
835 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (unpublished opinion).  
On remand, Eley was re-sentenced to consecutive terms of 
imprisonment of life without parole for second-degree murder 
and robbery and four to twelve years for conspiracy to 
commit robbery. 
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the merits under Pennsylvania law.
6,7
  Commonwealth v. Eley, 
835 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (unpublished opinion).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for 
allowance of appeal.  Commonwealth v. Eley, 842 A.2d 405 
(Pa. 2004). 
 On collateral appeal under Pennsylvania‘s Post 
Conviction Relief Act (―PCRA‖), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et 
seq., Eley re-cast the substantive issues he had raised on 
direct appeal as ineffective assistance challenges based on his 
counsel‘s failure to frame his claims under federal law.  The 
                                              
6
 The dissenting judge took issue with the Superior 
Court majority‘s resolution of Eley‘s jury instruction claim.  
Specifically, the dissent concluded that the trial judge ―on 
several occasions, suggested that the jury could ignore or 
disregard collateral issues about which they had doubt,‖ such 
as ―the credibility of witnesses who claimed to be at the scene 
of the crime.‖  App. at 273.  Thus, the dissent would have 
held that the ―jury instructions were unclear, confusing and 
prejudicial,‖ vacated the judgment of sentence, and remanded 
the case for a new trial.  Id. at 274. 
7
 While Eley‘s direct appeal to the Superior Court was 
pending, he unsuccessfully moved for a new trial based on 
after-discovered evidence in the Common Pleas Court, 
alleging that the murder weapon had been found in the 
possession of a third-party. 
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Common Pleas Court dismissed his PCRA petition.
8
  The 
Superior Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. Eley, 929 A.2d 
237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (unpublished opinion), and also 
denied his request for re-argument.  The Supreme Court again 
denied his petition for allowance of appeal.  Commonwealth 
v. Eley, 940 A.2d 362 (Pa. 2007). 
 Eley filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, claiming:  (1) ―[u]nder Jackson v. Virginia, evidence 
was insufficient to prove guilt;‖ (2) ―[i]mproper redaction of 
codefendants‘ statements, misuse of same by prosecutor and 
improper jury instruction;‖ and (3) ―[i]mproper, 
unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction.‖9  Petition 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 
                                              
8
 While Eley‘s first PCRA petition was pending before 
the Common Pleas Court, he filed a second PCRA petition 
based on additional after-discovered evidence.  He alleged 
that a third-party had admitted to being one of the three 
persons involved in the crimes and had implicated two 
additional third-parties in the crimes.  The Common Pleas 
Court dismissed Eley‘s second PCRA petition, and the 
Superior Court affirmed. 
9
 Eley also claimed ―[i]neffectiveness concerning after-
discovered evidence.‖  Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody at 6, 
Eley v. Erickson, No. 3-08-cv-00090 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 
2008).  The District Court denied this challenge on the merits, 
and we rejected Eley‘s application for a certificate of 
appealability as to this issue. 
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Person in State Custody at 5-9, Eley v. Erickson, No. 3-08-cv-
00090 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2008).  The District Court, without 
holding a hearing, ordered the dismissal of the petition on the 
merits and declined to order the issuance of a certificate of 
appealability.  Eley appealed.  Determining that his claims 
were ―adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 
further,‖ Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) 
(citation omitted), we granted Eley‘s application for a 
certificate of appealability. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Eley‘s habeas 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have 
jurisdiction over the District Court‘s order denying Eley‘s 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our 
review of the District Court‘s decision is plenary because no 
evidentiary hearing was held.  Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 
100 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus, we review the Superior Court‘s 
decision on direct appeal under ―the same standard that the 
 12 
District Court was required to apply,‖ namely, AEDPA.10  Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
                                              
10
 AEDPA governs our review of a state court‘s 
adjudication ―on the merits‖ of a habeas petitioner‘s claim.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Under AEDPA, we review the last state 
court decision on the merits.  Garrus v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 400 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43-45 (2011)).  
Unfortunately, neither Eley nor the Commonwealth has 
explicitly addressed whether the Superior Court‘s decision on 
direct appeal or the Superior Court‘s decision on PCRA 
appeal was the last state court decision on the merits. 
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 AEDPA imposes a ―highly deferential standard for 
evaluating state-court rulings‖ on habeas review, which 
―demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 
doubt.‖  Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) 
(quotations omitted).  AEDPA‘s ―difficult to meet‖ standard, 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011), establishes 
―a substantially higher threshold for obtaining relief than de 
novo review,‖ Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862 (quotation omitted).  
Thus, AEDPA ―reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard 
against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice 
                                                                                                     
Nonetheless, by citing to the Superior Court‘s decision 
on direct appeal, Eley has implicitly identified the last state 
court decision on the merits.  Appellant‘s Br. at 26 (citing 
App. at 261).  We agree with Eley‘s suggestion.  Eley 
presented his claims as substantive challenges on direct 
appeal and as ineffective assistance of counsel challenges on 
PCRA appeal, and ―[o]ur practice is to entertain the merits of 
the claims advanced.‖  Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  Further, the fact that the 
Superior Court on direct appeal decided these issues under 
state law does not preclude its determination from being on 
the merits under AEDPA.  See Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 
394, 398 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a state court 
decision may be on the merits under AEDPA even if it cites 
no United States Supreme Court precedent, ―‗so long as 
neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision 
contradicts‘‖ clearly established federal law (quoting Early v. 
Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam))).  Therefore, we 
will review the Superior Court‘s decision on direct appeal. 
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systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through 
appeal.‖  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quotation omitted). 
 AEDPA prohibits us from granting habeas relief 
―unless it is shown that the earlier state court‘s 
decision ‗was contrary to‘ federal law then 
clearly established in the holdings of [the 
United States Supreme] Court, [28 U.S.C.] 
§ 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
412 (2000); or that it ‗involved an unreasonable 
application of‘ such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it 
‗was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts‘ in light of the record before the state 
court, § 2254(d)(2).‖ 
Id. at 785. 
 A state court decision is ―contrary to‖ clearly 
established federal law if it ―applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth‖ in Supreme Court precedent, 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, or if it ―confronts a set of facts that 
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different‖ 
from that reached by the Supreme Court, id. at 406. 
 A state court decision is ―an unreasonable application 
of‖ clearly established federal law if it ―correctly identifies 
the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the 
facts of a particular prisoner‘s case.‖  Id. at 407-08.  We may 
not grant habeas relief merely because we believe that ―the 
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 
 15 
federal law erroneously or incorrectly.‖  Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 
1862 (quotation omitted).  ―Rather, that application must be 
objectively unreasonable.‖  Id. (quotation omitted).  Thus, 
―even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court‘s 
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.‖  Harrington, 131 S. 
Ct. at 786 (citation omitted). 
 A state court decision is based on ―an unreasonable 
determination of the facts‖ only if the state court‘s factual 
findings are ―‗objectively unreasonable in light of the 
evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.‘‖  Miller-El, 
537 U.S. at 340 (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).  
Moreover, the factual determinations of state trial and 
appellate courts are presumed to be correct.  Duncan v. 
Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001).  The petitioner 
bears the burden of ―rebutting the presumption by ‗clear and 
 16 
convincing evidence.‘‖11  Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 339 
(2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 
 Our analysis under AEDPA follows a prescribed path.  
We must first ―determine what arguments or theories 
supported or . . . could have supported, the state court‘s 
decision.‖  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.  We must next ―ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 
those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding 
in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.‖  Id.  We may, at 
                                              
11
 The Supreme Court has ―explicitly left open the 
question whether [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(e)(1) applies in every 
case presenting a challenge under § 2254(d)(2).‖  Wood v. 
Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010) (citation omitted).  In the 
absence of Supreme Court guidance, we have explained that 
§ 2254(e)(1) applies to a state court‘s subsidiary factual 
findings, and that a challenge under that section may be 
―based wholly or in part on evidence outside the state trial 
record.‖  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 235 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citations omitted).  We have also indicated that 
§ 2254(d)(2) applies to a state court‘s ultimate factual 
findings, and that a challenge under that section is based on 
―the totality of the evidence presented in the state-court 
proceeding.‖  Id. (quotation omitted).  Thus, we have applied 
§ 2254(e)(1) to challenges under § 2254(d)(2), but we have 
cautioned that ―even if a state court‘s individual factual 
determinations are overturned [under § 2254(e)(1)], what 
factual findings remain to support the state court decision 
must still be weighed under the overarching standard‖ under 
§ 2254(d)(2).  Id. at 235-36. 
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last, grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates 
that the state court decision ―was so lacking in justification 
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.‖  Id. at 786-87. 
 Even if the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under 
AEDPA, we will grant the writ only if the error was not 
harmless.  Under the harmless error standard, we must ―assess 
the prejudicial impact of [the] constitutional error in [the] 
state-court criminal trial.‖  Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 
(2007).  We will hold the error harmless unless it led to 
―actual prejudice,‖ in the form of a ―substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury‘s verdict.‖  Brecht 
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotation 
omitted). 
III. 
A. 
 Eley first claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right was violated when he was convicted of second-
degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery 
based on insufficient evidence.  Specifically, he contends that 
the Superior Court‘s rejection of his sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge was both contrary to and an unreasonable 
application of Jackson under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as well 
as an unreasonable determination of the facts under 
§ 2254(d)(2).  We agree with the District Court that Eley is 
not entitled to habeas relief on this issue. 
 18 
1. 
 We begin with an analysis of this issue under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  The clearly established federal law 
governing Eley‘s first claim was determined in Jackson, 
where the Supreme Court announced the constitutional 
minimum standard governing a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence:  a reviewing court must ask ―whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  
443 U.S. at 319 (citation omitted).  Stated differently, a court 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence may overturn a 
conviction only ―if it is found that upon the record evidence 
adduced at trial no rational trier of fact could have found 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖12  Id. at 324. 
a. 
 We first decide whether the Superior Court‘s 
adjudication of Eley‘s sufficiency of the evidence challenge 
                                              
12
 The Jackson Court provided several definitions of 
―reasonable doubt.‖  For example, a ―mere modicum‖ of 
evidence cannot ―by itself rationally support a conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  443 U.S. at 320.  Instead, 
reasonable doubt requires ―a subjective state of near certitude 
of the guilt of the accused.‖  Id. at 315 (citation omitted); see 
also id. at 317 n.9 (―A reasonable doubt has often been 
described as one based on reason which arises from the 
evidence or lack of evidence.‖ (quotation omitted)). 
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was contrary to Jackson.  The Superior Court described its 
standard of review as follows: 
―[‗W]hether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, and 
drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to 
the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence 
to find every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.[‘] . . .  Commonwealth v. 
George, 705 A.2d 916, 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998).  This Court may not reweigh the 
evidence and substitute its judgment for that of 
the factfinder.  Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 
A.2d 1076, 1082 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).‖ 
App. at 259-60.  We agree with the Superior Court‘s later 
conclusion on PCRA appeal that these rules do not contradict 
Jackson.  Id. at 612 (―[T]he federal standard enunciated in 
Jackson is [not] any different from that employed in 
Pennsylvania when reviewing sufficiency of the evidence 
questions.‖).  Nor does Eley argue that the facts of his case 
are materially indistinguishable from Jackson.  Thus, we hold 
that the Superior Court‘s adjudication of Eley‘s sufficiency of 
the evidence claim was not contrary to Jackson. 
b. 
 We next decide whether the Superior Court‘s 
adjudication of Eley‘s sufficiency of the evidence challenge 
was an unreasonable application of Jackson.  We review the 
evidence with reference to ―the substantive elements of the 
criminal offense as defined by state law.‖  Jackson, 443 U.S. 
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at 324 n.16.  But we also recognize that ―the minimum 
amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to 
prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.‖  Coleman 
v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam). 
i. 
 We first address whether a rational jury could have 
found Eley guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In Pennsylvania, to convict a defendant of 
criminal conspiracy, the jury must find that: 
―(1) the defendant intended to commit or aid in 
the commission of the criminal act; (2) the 
defendant entered into an agreement with 
another to engage in the crime; and (3) the 
defendant or one or more of the other co-
conspirators committed an overt act in 
furtherance of the agreed upon crime.‖ 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 920 (Pa. 2009) 
(quotation omitted).  Because it is hard to prove, the unlawful 
agreement ―may be established inferentially by circumstantial 
evidence, i.e. the relations, conduct or circumstances of the 
parties or overt acts on the part of co-conspirators.‖  
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 592 (Pa. 1998) 
(citation omitted). 
 Separately, evidence of a defendant‘s association with 
the perpetrator of the crime, presence at the scene of the 
crime, or knowledge of the crime cannot establish an 
unlawful agreement, Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 
 21 
1228, 1238 (Pa. 2004), but together, such evidence ―may 
coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a 
reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail,‖ 
Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2011) (quotation omitted).  Similarly, evidence of flight may 
support an inference of an unlawful agreement, but only 
where ―other evidence of guilt consists of more than mere 
presence at the scene.‖  Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 
A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  Finally, evidence of a 
false statement may support an inference that it was ―made 
with an intent to divert suspicion or to mislead the police or 
other authorities, or to establish an alibi or innocence.‖  
Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 161 A.2d 861, 870 (Pa. 1960) 
(quotation omitted). 
 The Superior Court found that the evidence showed 
that Eley, Eiland, and Mitchell ―were seen together near the 
scene of the crime by several individuals prior to the time of 
the incident.  They were seen acting together when the victim 
was shot.  The shooter exited the cab and joined the other two 
men.  All three fled the scene together.‖  App. at 261.  Based 
on this evidence, the Superior Court concluded that the ―jury 
could infer . . . that [Eley] and his co-defendants had 
conspired together to attack and rob the victim, and that the 
shooting of the victim and the entry into the cab were acts in 
furtherance of their plan.‖  Id.  Thus, according to the 
Superior Court, the evidence was sufficient to support Eley‘s 
conspiracy to commit robbery conviction. 
 Eley takes issue with the Superior Court‘s finding that 
he ―‗acted together‘ with his co-defendants during the crime.‖  
Appellant‘s Br. at 24-25.  He argues that, at most, the 
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evidence showed only that he was present at and fled from the 
scene of the crime.  He also asserts that there was no evidence 
linking him to the abandoned house or the weapons found 
therein.  For this reason, Eley maintains that there was ―no 
evidence that [he] had agreed to take part in a robbery.‖  Id. at 
20. 
 Eley analogizes his case to our decision in Johnson v. 
Mechling, 446 F. App‘x 531 (3d Cir. 2011).  There, the 
prisoner appealed the district court‘s denial of his habeas 
petition, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his convictions for first-degree murder as an 
accomplice and for conspiracy to commit murder.  In 
rejecting the prisoner‘s claim, the Superior Court had relied 
on the following evidence:  on the night of the murder, the 
prisoner, his co-defendant, and the victim were kicked out of 
a bar after an argument; when they left the bar, the victim was 
walked between the prisoner and his co-defendant; when the 
group arrived at an alley, there was a gunshot; after the 
gunshot, two people fled from the alley; and later, the 
victim‘s body and the murder weapon were discovered in the 
alley.  In reviewing the Superior Court‘s decision, we held 
that ―such evidence does not permit any reasonable fact finder 
to reasonably infer . . . specific intent to kill.‖  Id. at 540.  
Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for the District Court 
to issue the writ. 
 Unfortunately for Eley, after he filed his brief, the 
Supreme Court in Coleman summarily reversed our decision 
in Johnson.  In Coleman, the Court first admonished us for 
―imping[ing] on the jury‘s role as factfinder‖ through ―fine-
grained factual parsing,‖ and reminded us that ―Jackson 
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leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to 
draw from the evidence presented at trial.‖  132 S. Ct. at 
2064.  The Court then summarized additional relevant 
evidence:  the prisoner and his co-defendant were close 
friends; on the day of the murder, the prisoner heard his co-
defendant repeatedly proclaim that he was going to kill the 
victim; right before the murder, the co-defendant was 
noticeably concealing a weapon in the prisoner‘s presence; 
the prisoner helped his co-defendant escort the victim to the 
alley; and the prisoner stood at the entrance of the alley while 
his co-defendant killed the victim in the alley.  Based on this 
evidence, the Court concluded that a rational jury could have 
inferred that the prisoner:  (1) ―knew that [his co-defendant] 
was armed with a shotgun;‖ (2) ―knew that [his co-defendant] 
intended to kill [the victim];‖ (3) ―helped usher [the victim] 
into the alleyway to meet his fate;‖ and (4) ―may have been 
prepared to prevent [the victim] from fleeing.‖  Id. at 2065.  
Therefore, the Court held that the evidence ―was not nearly 
sparse enough to sustain a due process challenge under 
Jackson.‖  Id. (emphasis added). 
 Although the evidence is less compelling in this case 
than in Coleman, a rational jury could have made the same 
inferences in both cases.  Here, there was testimony that Eley 
and his co-defendants would hang out in the area near the 
abandoned house every day; that they were hanging out in the 
area of the abandoned house before the crime; that they ran 
fast together away from the taxi and towards the abandoned 
house after the crime; and that two firearms and three 
shotguns were recovered from the abandoned house during 
the investigation.  From this evidence, a jury could have 
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rationally inferred that Eley was close friends with his co-
defendants; that they had a weapons stash in the abandoned 
house; that they picked up weapons from the abandoned 
house before the crime; and that they dropped off weapons at 
the abandoned house after the crime.  Thus, a rational jury 
could have inferred that Eley knew that one of his co-
defendants was armed. 
 Additionally, witnesses testified that Eley and his co-
defendants were hanging out in the area of Hummel and 
Kittatinny before the crime; that during the crime, three black 
men were by the taxi, and that no one else was in the general 
area; that one of the three men entered the taxi and two shots 
were fired; that the other two men, instead of running away, 
waited for the first man right beside the taxi; that the first man 
exited the taxi and rejoined the other two men, and that 
another shot was fired while all three men were together by 
the side of the taxi; and that after the crime, Eley and his co-
defendants ran fast away from the taxi towards the abandoned 
house.  From this evidence, a jury could have rationally 
inferred that Eley and his co-defendants approached the taxi 
together; that Eley waited right beside the taxi while one of 
his co-defendants entered the cab and shot DeJesus twice; that 
Eley remained next to one of his co-defendants when he 
exited the taxi and shot DeJesus a third time; and that Eley 
fled with his co-defendants.  A rational jury could have thus 
inferred that Eley knew that one of his co-defendants intended 
to rob DeJesus. 
 Finally, a jury could have rationally inferred that Eley 
intended and agreed to rob DeJesus with his co-defendants.  
From the testimony that two men waited right beside the taxi 
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while one man entered and two shots were fired, a rational 
jury could have inferred that Eley was ―prepared to prevent 
[DeJesus] from fleeing.‖  Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2065.  
Further, from the testimony that Eley fled with his co-
defendants towards the abandoned house where multiple 
weapons were found, a rational jury could have inferred that 
Eley was ready to help one of his co-defendants hide the 
murder weapon.  Finally, from the testimony that Eley made a 
false statement to the police during the investigation, a 
rational jury could have inferred that Eley was attempting to 
hide his guilt. 
 Undeniably, in this case we are ―faced with a record of 
historical facts that supports conflicting inferences.‖  Jackson, 
443 U.S. at 326.  For example, from the fact that Eley and his 
co-defendants were loitering in the area of Hummel and 
Kittatinny before the crime plus the fact that they regularly 
hung out there, a rational jury could have inferred that they 
were standing around innocently.  However, we ―must 
presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the 
record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in 
favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.‖  
Id.  Returning to the previous example then, from the fact that 
Eley and his co-defendants were hanging out in the area of 
Hummel and Kittatinny before the crime plus the fact that the 
abandoned house – to which they fled and at which multiple 
weapons were found – was nearby, we must presume that the 
jury actually inferred that they were plotting to rob DeJesus.  
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Eley‘s conviction 
for conspiracy to commit robbery. 
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ii. 
 We next address whether a rational jury could have 
found Eley guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
Pennsylvania, a defendant is guilty of robbery ―if, in the 
course of committing a theft, he . . . physically takes or 
removes property from the person of another by force 
however slight.‖  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v).  A 
defendant is, in turn, guilty of theft ―if he unlawfully takes, or 
exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another 
with intent to deprive him thereof.‖  § 3921(a).  Because Eley 
was guilty of conspiracy, he could be guilty of robbery if 
either he or one of his co-defendants committed robbery in 
furtherance of their conspiracy.  Murphy, 844 A.2d at 1238 
(―[A conspirator] may be liable for the overt acts committed 
in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-
conspirator committed the act.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 The Superior Court found that the evidence ―indicated 
that [Eley] and his co-defendants confronted the victim with a 
gun and shot him three times.  One of the attackers entered 
the cab.  When the police arrived, the victim‘s money was 
missing.  No one else was seen entering the cab before the 
arrival of the police.‖  App. at 261-62.  ―While this evidence 
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was circumstantial,‖13 the Superior Court concluded that it 
―was sufficient to convict [Eley] of robbery.‖  Id. at 262. 
 Eley argues that there was ―no evidence that [he] was 
part of a robbery.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 20.  But because Eley 
conspired to commit robbery, the Commonwealth was not 
required to prove that he participated in the robbery, only that 
one of his co-conspirators did so.  Murphy, 844 A.2d at 1238.  
Eley also asserts that ―there was no evidence that [he] 
benefited in any way from the robbery, such as possession of 
money.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 25.  However, such evidence is 
unnecessary to support his conviction because ―proof of an 
attempted theft is sufficient to establish the ‗in the course of 
committing a theft‘ element of robbery.‖  Commonwealth v. 
Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. 2011) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3701(a)(1)-(2)). 
 At trial, there was testimony that DeJesus possessed 
$250.00 before the crime; that he always kept his money in a 
pouch in his taxi while he was working; that Eley and his co-
defendants were hanging out in the area of Hummel and 
Kittatinny before the crime; that during the crime, three black 
men were by the taxi and no one else was in the general area; 
                                              
13
 Eley argues that the evidence was too circumstantial 
to sustain a judgment under Jackson.  But it is well 
established that the Commonwealth ―may sustain its burden 
of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.‖  
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2009) (quotation omitted). 
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that one of the men then entered the taxi and two shots were 
fired; that Eley and his co-defendants fled from the taxi after 
the crime; and that neither DeJesus‘s cash nor his pouch was 
found on his person or in his taxi during the investigation.  
From this evidence, a rational jury could have inferred that 
Eley or one of his co-defendants physically took DeJesus‘s 
cash by force with the intent to deprive him thereof.  Thus, 
there was sufficient evidence supporting Eley‘s conviction for 
robbery. 
iii. 
 We finally address whether a rational jury could have 
found Eley guilty of second-degree murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In Pennsylvania, ―[m]urder of the second 
degree is a criminal homicide committed while a defendant 
was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the 
perpetration of a felony.‖  Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 
A.2d 1010, 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (en banc) (citing 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(b)).  Further, ―perpetration of a felony‖ 
includes the commission or the attempted commission of a 
robbery as a principal or as an accomplice, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2502(d), and ―criminal homicide‖ means ―intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently caus[ing] the death of 
another human being,‖ § 2501(a).  Finally, the ―intent to 
commit the underlying crime is imputed to the killing to make 
it second-degree murder.‖  Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1022 (citing, 
inter alia, Commonwealth v. Mikell, 729 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. 
1999)).  Again, Eley could be guilty of second-degree murder 
if either he or one of his co-defendants committed second-
degree murder in furtherance of their conspiracy.  Murphy, 
844 A.2d at 1238. 
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 The Superior Court found that DeJesus ―was killed by 
three shots fired by [Eley] or a co-defendant while they were 
committing the felony of robbery.‖  App. at 262.  For this 
reason, the Superior Court concluded that the evidence ―was 
sufficient to convict [Eley] of second-degree murder.‖  Id. 
 A review of the testimony reveals that DeJesus 
possessed $250.00 before the crime; that he always kept his 
money in a pouch in his taxi while he was working; that Eley 
and his co-defendants were hanging out in the area of 
Hummel and Kittatinny before the crime; that during the 
crime, three black men were by the taxi and no one else was 
in the general area; that one of the three men entered the taxi 
and two shots were fired; that the first man exited the taxi and 
rejoined the other two men by the side of the taxi and a third 
shot was fired; that Eley and his co-defendants fled from the 
taxi after the crime; that neither DeJesus‘s cash nor his pouch 
was found on his person or in his taxi during the 
investigation; and that DeJesus later died from three gunshot 
wounds to his head and neck.  A rational jury could have 
inferred from this evidence that Eley or one of his co-
defendants killed DeJesus while robbing him.  Thus, Eley‘s 
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conviction for second-degree murder was supported by 
sufficient evidence.
14
 
                                              
14
 The Superior Court did not analyze Eley‘s challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence under an accomplice theory 
of liability.  Nonetheless, we note that even if no rational jury 
could have found Eley guilty of conspiracy to commit 
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence was 
sufficient to support his convictions for second-degree murder 
and robbery as an accomplice.  Because Eley was re-
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole for 
his second-degree murder and robbery convictions, reversing 
his conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery would 
provide little relief. 
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Under Pennsylvania law, the difference between 
conspiracy and accomplice liability is that accomplice 
liability, unlike conspiracy liability, does not require proof of 
an unlawful agreement.  Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 
1228, 1238 (Pa. 2004).  Thus, accomplice liability only 
requires proof of two elements:  (1) ―that the defendant 
intended to aid or promote the underlying offense;‖ and 
(2) ―that the defendant actively participated in the crime by 
soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal.‖  Id. at 
1234 (citation omitted).  ―Both requirements may be 
established wholly by circumstantial evidence.‖  
Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1251 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2005) (en banc) (citing Murphy, 844 A.2d at 
1234).  While ―a defendant cannot be an accomplice simply 
based on evidence that he knew about the crime or was 
present at the crime scene,‖ Murphy, 844 A.2d at 1234 
(citation omitted), ―the least degree of concert or collusion in 
the commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding 
of responsibility as an accomplice,‖ Kimbrough, 872 A.2d at 
1251 (quoting Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 425 A.2d 387, 
390 (Pa. 1981)). 
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 We acknowledge that under Jackson – which allows us 
to ―set aside the jury‘s verdict on the ground of insufficient 
evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed 
with the jury‖ – this is a close case.  Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 
2062 (quotation omitted).  But in addition to the first layer of 
deference we owe to the jury under Jackson, we owe a second 
layer of deference to the Superior Court under AEDPA.  Id.; 
see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam) 
(―[A] federal court may . . . overturn a state court decision 
rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge . . . only if 
the state court decision was ‗objectively unreasonable.‘‖ 
(citation omitted)).  Had we been the jury, we might have 
acquitted Eley; had we been the Superior Court, we might 
even have reversed his conviction.  But applying our doubly 
deferential standard of review, we simply cannot conclude 
that it was objectively unreasonable for the Superior Court to 
decide that a rational jury could have found Eley guilty of 
second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit 
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. 
at 4 (recognizing that ―the inevitable consequence‖ of this 
                                                                                                     
Without belaboring the point, a rational jury could 
have inferred that Eley intended to aid and actively 
participated in the crimes by standing right beside the taxi to 
prevent DeJesus from fleeing while one of his co-defendants 
was inside the cab and by fleeing with his co-defendants to 
the abandoned house to hide their weapons.  Therefore, in the 
alternative, the evidence was sufficient to support Eley‘s 
convictions for second-degree murder and robbery as an 
accomplice. 
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double deference ―is that judges will sometimes encounter 
convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they 
must nonetheless uphold‖). 
2. 
 Having rejected Eley‘s claim under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1), we conclude with an analysis of this issue under 
§ 2254(d)(2).
15
  Eley contends that the determination that he 
agreed with Eiland and Mitchell to rob DeJesus was based on 
an unreasonable finding that he ―act[ed] together‖ with his 
co-defendants.  Appellant‘s Br. at 26.  We have recounted 
that there was testimony that Eley waited right beside the taxi 
while one of his co-defendants entered the cab and fired two 
shots; that instead of immediately fleeing, he waited for his 
co-defendant to exit the cab and rejoin him by the side of taxi 
and fire another shot; that he fled with his co-defendants from 
the taxi towards the abandoned house, and that two firearms 
and three shotguns were recovered from the abandoned house 
during the investigation.  Although this evidence could have 
been interpreted as ―mere presence and flight,‖ id., that 
                                              
15
 We note that one Court of Appeals has held that 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) ―is not readily applicable to Jackson 
cases.‖  Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 
2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Waddington v. 
Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009); but see O’Laughlin v. 
O’Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 298 n.14 (1st Cir. 2009) (declining to 
adopt the Sarausad analysis).  We will assume that 
§ 2254(d)(2) is applicable to Jackson cases and decide Eley‘s 
claim on the merits. 
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alternative interpretation ―does not—by itself—rise to the 
level of clear and convincing evidence,‖ necessary for Eley to 
rebut the presumptive correctness attached to the Superior 
Court‘s factual finding under § 2254(e)(1).  Rountree v. 
Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 543 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 
 We have also described testimony that Eley was close 
friends with his co-defendants; that he left the abandoned 
house and approached the taxi with his co-defendants; and 
that a cache of weapons was later recovered from the 
abandoned house.  From this evidence, plus the fact that Eley 
acted together with his co-defendants during the crimes, we 
hold that the Superior Court‘s determination that he agreed 
with Eiland and Mitchell to rob DeJesus was not objectively 
unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2).  See Wood v. Allen, 130 S. 
Ct. 841, 850-51 (2010) (holding, under § 2254(d)(2), that 
even if the state court‘s decision was debatable, it was not 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence).  Therefore, we will affirm the District 
Court‘s denial of Eley‘s first claim. 
B. 
 Eley next claims that his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right was violated when his non-testifying co-
defendants‘ confessions were admitted against him at their 
joint trial.  Specifically, he contends that the Superior Court‘s 
rejection of his challenge to the trial judge‘s denial of his 
motion to sever was contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of Bruton, Richardson, and Gray.  On this issue, 
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we part ways with the District Court and conclude that Eley is 
entitled to habeas relief.
16
 
1. 
 Before analyzing Eley‘s claim, we present the relevant 
confession testimony and jury instructions.  At Eley‘s joint 
trial, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence two 
extrajudicial statements by Eiland and one extrajudicial 
statement by Mitchell, neither of whom testified.  The 
Commonwealth first called Matthew LeVan, who was 
incarcerated with Eiland at the Dauphin County Prison in July 
                                              
16
 To be fair, we note that the District Court analyzed 
this issue as a claim that Eley‘s ―counsel provided ineffective 
assistance . . . by not objecting to the admission of statements 
made by co-defendants,‖ App. at 13, since Eley framed this 
issue as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his pro 
se memorandum of law in support of his pro se habeas 
petition, Petitioner‘s Memorandum of Law in Support of His 
Previously Filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
Addressing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act at 31-41, Eley v. Erickson, No. 3-08-cv-00090 (M.D. Pa. 
Jan. 14, 2008).  However, we granted the certificate of 
appealability in this case ―as to Claim[] . . . 4 in [Eley‘s] 
habeas petition,‖ App. at 3, which presents a Bruton claim, 
Petition at 9.  Additionally, the parties have briefed this issue 
as a Bruton claim.  Appellant‘s Br. at 35-42; Appellee‘s Br. at 
19-21.  Accordingly, we will analyze this issue as a Bruton 
claim rather than as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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2000.  The prosecutor began by asking LeVan if Eiland was 
―in the courtroom.‖  App. at 136.  After LeVan responded in 
the affirmative, the prosecutor then requested that LeVan 
identify Eiland, inquiring:  ―Of the three Defendants, which—
is he farthest?  Middle?  Closest?‖  Id. at 136-37.  LeVan 
selected Eiland as the closest of the three defendants at the 
counsel table.  Moments later, LeVan testified that Eiland 
confessed to him that: 
―[T]hey—they, as in whoever was with him—
he didn‘t say the names of those people—when 
he went up to them, it was supposed to be a 
robbery, and he was—he‘s the one that shot 
him, but he didn‘t mean to do it.  It was the 
other two‘s idea or something like that, in that 
sense.‖17 
Id. at 138.  No limiting instruction accompanied LeVan‘s 
testimony. 
                                              
17
 LeVan‘s testimony that ―[Eiland] didn‘t say the 
names of those people‖ arguably implies that the confession 
was not redacted.  App. at 138.  However, the 
Commonwealth admits that ―the trial court ordered that the 
statements by Eley‘s co-defendants, Eiland and Mitchell, be 
redacted so that they did not refer to any other person than the 
speaker.‖  Appellee‘s Br. at 20.  Moreover, the Superior 
Court found that ―the trial court ordered that the statements 
by Eiland and Mitchell be redacted so that they did not refer 
to [Eley],‖ App. at 263, and we must presume that this factual 
determination was correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 
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 The Commonwealth next called Steven Taylor, who 
was Eiland‘s cellmate at the Dauphin County Prison in July 
2000.  According to Taylor, Eiland confessed to him that 
―they were there to rob a cabdriver, and I guess with different 
things you [sic] did or whatnot during the evening, 
somewhere, somehow, something went wrong and whatnot.  
Somebody ended up dead from that.‖  Id. at 152.  Again, the 
trial judge gave no limiting instruction for Taylor‘s testimony. 
 The Commonwealth finally called Kevin Duffin, a 
Harrisburg Police Bureau detective, who took Mitchell‘s 
written statement in July 2000.  According to Duffin, Mitchell 
confessed to him: 
―[B]etween 12 and, I think, 1, 1:30 in the 
morning, July 5th, that he was at the corner of 
Kittatinny and Elm Street . . . [f]iring weapons 
into the air [with two other people]. . . .  They 
took [the three firearms and two shotguns] to a 
house on Hummel Street before they placed one 
of the shotguns under a mattress and took one to 
the second floor.  But pretty much they hid the 
weapons; loaded them and hid them in the 
house.‖ 
Id. at 161.  Immediately after Duffin‘s testimony, the trial 
judge instructed the jury: 
―Now, the reference by Mr. Mitchell to ‗they,‘ 
the pronoun ‗they,‘ we have, as you see here, 
three Defendants on trial.  But I instruct you 
that you may not draw any assumption or 
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conclusion from this testimony of the officer 
that Edward Mitchell was speaking about the 
other two Defendants in this case. 
When Edward Mitchell speaks, he speaks for 
himself in other words.  So anything that the 
officer is saying about it or Mitchell should be 
limited to Edward Mitchell and not to the other 
two Defendants in this case.‖ 
Id. at 163. 
 During the jury charge, the trial judge gave two more 
limiting instructions.  The jury was first instructed: 
―Earlier in the trial you heard me give you an 
instruction regarding a statement—several 
statements—that were made by one or more of 
the Defendants, and I want to repeat that 
instruction to you now.  This involves any 
statement by an individual to the police. 
That statement can only be used against the 
person speaking.  It cannot be used against 
anyone else.  There is a rule which restricts use 
by you of the evidence offered to show that the 
Defendants, Eiland and Mitchell, made 
statements concerning the crime charged. 
A statement made before trial may be conferred 
as evidence only against the Defendant who 
made that statement.  Thus, you may consider 
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the statement evidence against Eiland and 
Mitchell if you believe they made the statement 
voluntarily.  You must not, however, consider 
the statement as evidence against the statement 
of [sic] Karim.  You must not use the 
statements in any way against them [sic].‖ 
Id. at 193.  And the trial judge later instructed: 
―Oh, there was one other point I was supposed 
to give you and I neglected.  Again, in giving 
the example of felony murder and whether a 
robbery did occur here, and I said one of the 
examples of direct evidence of that was the 
statement of one of the Defendants. 
Once again, as I told you, I think before, that 
statement by that Defendant who indicated, if 
you believe that he did make the statement and 
you believe it to be true, if the purpose was 
robbery, that can only be held against that 
person who made the statement and no one 
else.‖ 
Id. at 200. 
2. 
 Our summary of the relevant confession testimony and 
jury instructions complete, we next review Bruton, 
Richardson, and Gray, which ―establish the controlling 
precedent for [Eley‘s claim] for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 2254(d)(1).‖  Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The Supreme Court first decided Bruton, where a 
defendant and his co-defendant were jointly tried for robbery.  
The non-testifying co-defendant‘s unredacted confession that 
―[he] and petitioner committed the armed robbery‖ was 
admitted.  391 U.S. at 124.  At the close of the Government‘s 
case, the jury was instructed that the confession could not be 
considered as evidence against the defendant. 
 The Bruton Court held that a defendant‘s Sixth 
Amendment confrontation right is violated when a non-
testifying co-defendant‘s extrajudicial statement inculpating 
the defendant is introduced at a joint trial, even if a jury is 
instructed that the confession may be considered as evidence 
only against the declarant.  The Court reasoned that ―there are 
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or 
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences 
of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and 
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.‖  Id. 
at 135 (citations omitted).  The Court concluded that ―[s]uch a 
context is presented . . . where the powerfully incriminating 
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused 
side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread 
before the jury in a joint trial,‖ id. at 135-36, and thus, that the 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment confrontation right is violated 
in this situation, regardless of whether the jury receives an 
appropriate limiting instruction. 
 The Court revisited Bruton in Richardson, where two 
of three alleged perpetrators were jointly tried for murder.  
The non-testifying co-defendant‘s confession ―was redacted 
to omit all reference to [the defendant]‖ and ―all indication 
 41 
that anyone other than [the declarant] and [a third-party] 
participated in the crime.‖  481 U.S. at 203.  As redacted, the 
confession only revealed that the declarant and the third-party 
planned the murder during a car ride to the victim‘s house.  
But the defendant herself later testified that she had been 
along for the ride.  After the confession was admitted and 
after closing arguments, the jury was instructed that the 
confession could not be used against the defendant. 
 Limiting Bruton, the Richardson Court held that ―the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant‘s confession with a proper limiting 
instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate 
not only the defendant‘s name, but any reference to . . . her 
existence.‖  Id. at 211.  The Court explained that the 
confession at issue ―was not incriminating on its face, and 
became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at 
trial.‖  Id. at 208.  The Richardson Court distinguished the 
confession that ―expressly implicated‖ the defendant in 
Bruton from the confession that ―contextually implicated‖ the 
defendant in that case, reasoning that because ―testimony that 
‗the defendant helped me commit the crime‘ is more vivid 
than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult to 
thrust out of mind,‖ jury instructions are ineffective against 
Bruton-type confessions, but effective against Richardson-
type confessions.  Id. 
 The Court again returned to Bruton in Gray, where a 
defendant and his co-defendant were jointly tried for murder.  
The non-testifying co-defendant had confessed that he, the 
defendant, a third-party, ―and a few other guys‖ were ―in the 
group that beat‖ the victim to death.  523 U.S. at 196.  This 
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confession was redacted by substituting ―a kind of symbol, 
namely, the word ‗deleted‘ or a blank space set off by 
commas‖ for the names of the defendant and the third-party.  
Id. at 192.  After closing arguments, the jury was instructed 
that it should not use the confession against the defendant. 
 The Gray Court held that ―as a class, redactions that 
replace a proper name with an obvious blank, the word 
‗delete,‘ a symbol, or similarly notify the jury that a name has 
been deleted are similar enough to Bruton‘s unredacted 
confessions as to warrant the same legal results.‖  Id. at 195.  
The Court arrived at this holding despite acknowledging that 
―in some instances the person to whom the blank refers may 
not be clear,‖ id. at 194, such as in a case where a confession 
―uses two (or more) blanks, even though only one other 
defendant appears at trial, and in which the trial indicates that 
there are more participants than the confession has named,‖ 
id. at 195.  In so holding, the Gray Court expanded Bruton, 
concluding that a confession redacted in this way is ―directly 
accusatory,‖ id. at 194, because it ―facially incriminat[es]‖ the 
defendant, id. at 196 (quotation and emphasis omitted). 
 The Gray Court‘s holding also limited Richardson.  
The Gray Court reasoned that although Richardson seemed to 
exempt all inferentially incriminatory confessions from the 
Bruton rule, the Richardson rule actually depended ―in 
significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, 
inference.‖  Id.  The Court elaborated:  ―Richardson‘s 
inferences involved statements that did not refer directly to 
the defendant himself and which became incriminating only 
when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.‖  Id. 
(quotation omitted).  In contrast, Gray‘s inferences involved 
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―statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to 
someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve 
inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, 
even were the confession the very first item introduced at 
trial.‖  Id. 
3. 
 Having presented the applicable clearly established 
federal law, we first analyze whether the Superior Court‘s 
decision affirming the trial judge‘s denial of Eley‘s motion to 
sever was contrary to Bruton, Richardson, and Gray.  The 
Superior Court described the law as follows: 
―Admission of [an inculpatory statement by a 
co-defendant implicating the defendant] violates 
a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him.  Courts 
have addressed this problem by redacting 
confessions of non-testifying co-defendants to 
remove references implicating the defendant. 
. . .  However, the Sixth Amendment is only 
violated where the implication arises from the 
face of the redacted statements and not from 
linkage to other evidence.‖ 
App. at 263-64 (citation omitted).  We conclude, like the 
Superior Court on PCRA appeal, that these rules do not 
contradict the clearly established federal law in Bruton and its 
progeny.  Id. at 617 (―[Eley] fails to persuade us that, had trial 
counsel argued that the redaction was insufficient in 
accordance with federal cases including Bruton [and its 
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progeny], the outcome would have been different.‖).  Again, 
Eley does not argue that the facts of his case are materially 
indistinguishable from the facts in Bruton and its progeny.  
Thus, we hold that the Superior Court‘s decision was not 
contrary to Bruton and its progeny. 
4. 
 We next analyze whether the Superior Court‘s decision 
upholding the trial judge‘s rejection of Eley‘s severance 
request was an unreasonable application of Bruton, 
Richardson, and Gray.  Although Eley takes exception to all 
three of the extrajudicial statements of his non-testifying co-
defendants admitted at their joint trial, our discussion focuses 
on LeVan‘s testimony that Eiland confessed that ―he‘s the 
one that shot him,‖ but that ―[i]t was the other two‘s idea.‖  
App. at 138.  Because we conclude that the Superior Court‘s 
adjudication of Eley‘s claim with respect to this confession 
was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law under Bruton and its progeny, we need not decide 
whether Taylor‘s testimony that Eiland confessed that ―they 
were there to rob a cabdriver,‖ id. at 152, or Duffin‘s 
testimony that Mitchell stated that he was firing weapons 
around the time and near the vicinity of the crimes ―with two 
other people,‖ id. at 161, constituted additional Bruton 
violations. 
 Eley argues that the admission of Eiland‘s confession 
was error because it ―referred to [his] existence.‖  Appellant‘s 
Br. at 37.  Specifically, Eley asserts that Gray controls 
because Eiland‘s confession ―made clear that three men (the 
precise number in the courtroom) participated in the 
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crime[s].‖  Id. at 41.  Thus, Eley claims that he was ―directly 
implicated‖ in the crimes.  Id. at 42.  The Commonwealth 
counters that the confession was redacted so that it ―did not 
refer to any other person than the speaker,‖ and that Eley‘s 
contention regarding the reference in the confession to the 
number of participants in the crimes ―is a clear attempt at 
contextual implication‖ governed by Richardson.18  
Appellee‘s Br. at 20. 
 The Superior Court first found that ―the trial court 
ordered that statement[] by Eiland . . . be redacted so that [it] 
                                              
18
 The Commonwealth also argues, in the alternative, 
that Eiland‘s confession made ―no . . . contextual implication 
of Eley‖ because it did not refer to Eley‘s involvement in the 
crimes.  Appellee‘s Br. at 21.  For this reason, according to 
the Commonwealth, Richardson is inapplicable and limiting 
instructions were not required.  The Commonwealth 
misunderstands the nature of contextual implication, which 
may occur even if a non-testifying co-defendant‘s confession 
is redacted so that it does not reference a defendant‘s name or 
his participation in a crime.  The confession in Richardson 
was redacted in this way, and the Supreme Court nonetheless 
found that the confession contextually implicated the 
defendant ―when linked with evidence introduced later at 
trial.‖  481 U.S. at 208.  The Richardson Court went on to 
hold that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
was not violated by the confession‘s introduction into 
evidence so long as it was accompanied by a proper limiting 
instruction.  Id. at 211.  In any event, we believe that Eiland‘s 
confession expressly implicated Eley.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
 46 
did not refer to [Eley],‖ App. at 263, and that, as redacted, 
that statement only indicated that ―[Eiland] had pulled the 
trigger,‖ id. at 264.  The Superior Court then concluded that 
―[n]one of the statements by Eiland or Mitchell that were 
presented to the jury referred to [Eley] or directly implicated 
him in any way,‖ id. at 264-65, and that ―[t]he trial court 
properly instructed the jury that such statements were to be 
used as evidence against only the individual who made the 
statement,‖ id. at 264.  Thus, according to the Superior Court, 
the trial judge did not err in denying Eley‘s motion to sever 
his trial from that of his co-defendants. 
 The Superior Court‘s reliance on the trial judge‘s jury 
instructions reveals that it believed that Richardson governed 
Eley‘s case.  But Richardson does not support the Superior 
Court‘s conclusion that Eiland‘s confession did not refer to 
Eley.  Richardson‘s holding is explicitly limited to a 
confession that is redacted to eliminate ―not only the 
defendant‘s name, but any reference to his . . . existence.‖  
481 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added).  Here, Eiland‘s confession 
was redacted to omit any reference to Eley‘s name.  However, 
Eiland‘s statement that ―he‘s the one that shot him,‖ but that 
―[i]t was the other two‘s idea‖ expressly referred to the 
existence of exactly three people:  himself and two others.  
App. at 138.  Eiland‘s express reference to the existence of 
Eley and Mitchell as ―the other two,‖ id., could not have been 
lost on the jury because, as the Commonwealth emphasized 
shortly before introducing the confession into evidence, there 
were exactly ―three Defendants‖ sitting at the defense table 
―in the courtroom,‖ id. at 136. 
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 Gray, moreover, contradicts the Superior Court‘s 
conclusion that Eiland‘s confession did not directly implicate 
Eley.  Gray‘s holding explicitly extends to a confession that is 
redacted to ―replace a proper name with . . . a symbol,‖ 523 
U.S. at 195, which ―facially incriminat[es]‖ a defendant, id. at 
196 (quotation and emphasis omitted).  Here, the 
Commonwealth merely replaced Eley and Mitchell‘s names 
in Eiland‘s confession with a type of symbol—the number 
two.  Further, all three defendants were charged together and 
jointly tried under conspiracy, accomplice, and principal 
theories of liability.  For this reason, Eiland‘s confession that 
―he‘s the one that shot him‖ directly implicated himself as a 
principal, and his statement that ―[i]t was the other two‘s 
idea‖ directly implicated both Eley and Mitchell as his co-
conspirators and accomplices.  App. at 138. 
 Although we are mindful of the deference that we owe 
to the Commonwealth‘s courts, we are constrained to 
conclude that fairminded jurists could not disagree that the 
Superior Court‘s decision is inconsistent with Richardson and 
Gray.  We have no doubt that the jury inferred, on the basis of 
Eiland‘s confession alone, that Eley was one of ―the other 
two‖ whose ―idea‖ it was to rob DeJesus.  App. at 138.  As in 
Gray, ―[t]he inferences at issue here involve[d] statements 
that, despite redaction, obviously refer[red] directly to 
someone . . . and which involve[d] inferences that a jury 
ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession 
the very first item introduced at trial.‖  523 U.S. at 196.  
Indeed, a juror who wondered to whom ―the other two‖ 
referred, App. at 138, ―need[ed] only lift his eyes to [Eley and 
Mitchell], sitting at counsel table, to find what . . . seem[ed] 
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the obvious answer,‖ Gray, 523 U.S. at 193.  Therefore, we 
hold that the Superior Court‘s affirmance of the trial judge‘s 
denial of Eley‘s motion to sever was an unreasonable 
application of Bruton and its progeny.
19
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 Although we conclude that Eley‘s case is controlled 
by Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), we pause to point 
out that we would likely reach the same conclusion even if it 
were governed by Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).  
Eley argues that the limiting instruction was ―woefully 
inadequate‖ because it was only offered after and only 
applied to Duffin‘s testimony about Mitchell‘s confession.  
Appellant‘s Br. at 42.  The Commonwealth disagrees and 
asserts that Richardson was satisfied because the trial judge 
―charged the jury on at least three occasions that any 
statement by a defendant was to be used as evidence against 
that defendant only,‖ and ―[s]pecifically . . . instructed the 
jury not to use the statements against Eley.‖  Appellee‘s Br. at 
20.  The Superior Court, in turn, denied Eley‘s appeal because 
―[t]he trial court properly instructed the jury that [the] 
statements were to be used as evidence against only the 
individual who made the statement.‖  App. at 264. 
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Here, the trial judge likely violated Richardson by 
failing to instruct the jury contemporaneously with the 
admission of Eiland‘s confession.  Richardson held that the 
admission of a non-testifying co-defendant‘s confession that 
contextually implicates a defendant is permissible only if it is 
accompanied by a ―proper limiting instruction.‖  481 U.S. at 
211.  In Delli Paoli v. United States, the Supreme Court 
defined an ―appropriate instruction‖ as one that is made ―at 
the time of the admission‖ and that ―make[s] it clear that the 
evidence is limited as against the declarant only.‖  352 U.S. 
232, 238 (1957) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other 
grounds by Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.  Although Bruton 
overruled Delli Paoli‘s holding that a limiting instruction is 
sufficient to protect a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right when his non-testifying co-defendant‘s 
confession expressly implicating him is admitted at their joint 
trial, Richardson demonstrates that Delli Paoli‘s definition of 
an appropriate limiting instruction survives in non-Bruton 
contexts.  Moreover, a compelling case could certainly be 
made that the instructions that the trial judge later provided 
were incorrectly limited to ―any statement by an individual to 
the police,‖ App. at 193, and thus insufficient to ―dissuad[e] 
the jury from entering onto the path of inference in the first 
place,‖ Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208.  Therefore, if Eley‘s 
case were not controlled by Gray, the Superior Court‘s 
affirmance of the trial judge‘s denial of Eley‘s motion to 
sever would likely be an unreasonable application of 
Richardson. 
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 We had occasion to address a scenario similar to this 
one in Vazquez, 550 F.3d 270.
20
  Vazquez concerned the joint 
trial of a defendant and his co-defendant for murder.  Prior to 
trial, the non-testifying co-defendant told police that the 
defendant ―was the shooter and that he and [a third-party] 
were surprised when [the defendant] opened fire.‖  Id. at 273.  
At trial, the declarant‘s statement was redacted by replacing 
the names of the defendant and the third-party with the 
neutral terms ―my boy‖ and ―the other guy.‖  Id. at 274.  
After closing arguments, the jury was instructed that it could 
not consider the confession as evidence against the defendant. 
 On habeas review, we recognized that ―ordinarily the 
use of a term like ‗the other guy‘ will satisfy Bruton.‖  Id. at 
282.  However, we reasoned that the redacted confession 
indicated there were only two possible shooters:  ―my boy‖ 
and ―the other guy.‖  Id. at 281.  We determined that it was 
highly probable that the jury would believe that the declarant 
was referring to the defendant as the shooter because the 
third-party was not on trial, and the Commonwealth argued 
that the defendant was the shooter.  Thus, we granted habeas 
                                              
20
 We recognize that under AEDPA, ―court of appeals 
precedent is irrelevant to the ultimate issue,‖ because ―we are 
obliged to ascertain whether the state court decision being 
examined was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.‖  Vazquez v. 
Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 282 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations 
omitted).  Thus, as evidenced by our analysis, our holding 
does not depend on Vazquez. 
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relief, concluding that if that case did not involve an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 
under Bruton and its progeny, ―it [would be] difficult to 
conceive of any case that could meet that admittedly exacting 
standard.‖  Id. 
 Eley presents an even more compelling case for 
habeas relief than Vazquez.  In Vazquez, the jury had to 
decide whether the declarant‘s statement, which implicated a 
single shooter in the murder, referred to the defendant or the 
absent third-party.  In other words, Vazquez presented the 
unclear case, foreshadowed by Gray, where ―a confession . . . 
uses two . . . blanks, even though only one other defendant 
appears at trial.‖  523 U.S. at 195.  Here, the jury was not 
required to make a comparable choice; Eiland‘s confession 
expressly implicated exactly three people in the crimes and 
exactly three defendants appeared at the joint trial.  If the 
defendant in Vazquez merited habeas relief, it is difficult to 
conceive of any reason that Eley is unworthy of such relief. 
 Vazquez is analogous for another reason.  In Vazquez, 
the Superior Court affirmed the Common Pleas Court‘s 
admission of the confession by relying heavily on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court‘s decision in Commonwealth v. 
Travers, 768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 2001).  On habeas review, we 
indicated that while we were cognizant of the respect that we 
owed to the Commonwealth‘s courts, ―we [were] compelled 
to recognize‖ that the Supreme Court in Travers and its 
progeny ―came close to endorsing a bright-line rule that when 
terms like ‗my boy,‘ the ‗other guy,‘ or the ‗other man‘ are 
used to substitute for an actual name . . . there cannot be a 
 52 
Bruton violation.‖21  Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 281.  We 
concluded that the adoption of such a bright-line rule was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 
under Bruton and its progeny. 
 Regrettably, the Commonwealth‘s courts, which did 
not have the benefit of our decision in Vazquez, appear to 
have made the same mistake here.  The trial judge evidently 
replaced the names of Eley and Mitchell with the term ―the 
other two‖ rather than replacing each of their names with the 
term ―the other man.‖  The Superior Court, citing only 
Travers, affirmed because ―the trial court ordered that 
statement[] by Eiland . . . be redacted so that [it] did not refer 
to [Eley.]‖  App. at 263.  If – as we suspect – the Superior 
Court affirmed the trial judge through a mechanical 
application of the Travers bright-line rule, it thereby 
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 We discerned this bright-line rule from the following 
language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 
―[T]he co-defendant‘s statement here was 
redacted to replace references to appellant by 
name with the term ‗the other man.‘  Although 
this was not the type of redaction at issue in 
Gray, the Gray Court‘s reasoning, including its 
distinction of Richardson, leaves little question 
that this sort of redaction is appropriate under 
the Sixth Amendment.‖ 
Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 281 (quoting Commonwealth v. Travers, 
768 A.2d 845, 850-51 (Pa. 2001)). 
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unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under 
Bruton and its progeny. 
 Finally – and this should come as no surprise in light 
of our discussion of Eley‘s Jackson claim in Part III.A – we 
conclude that the Bruton error was not harmless.  Indeed, the 
Commonwealth makes no argument to the contrary.  Here, as 
in Bruton, the admission of LeVan‘s damning testimony 
about Eiland‘s confession implicating Eley ―added 
substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the 
[Commonwealth‘s] case in a form not subject to cross-
examination.‖  391 U.S. at 128.  Because the devastating 
―effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped 
from the brains of the jurors,‖ we conclude that the Bruton 
error substantially influenced the jury‘s verdict.  Id. at 129.  
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Accordingly, we will grant Eley habeas relief on his Bruton 
claim.
22
 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we hold that although 
Eley is not entitled to habeas relief on his Jackson claim, he 
is entitled to such relief on his Bruton claim.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the District Court‘s denial of his habeas 
petition, and we will remand this case with instructions that 
the District Court order that the Commonwealth retry Eley 
within 120 days or else dismiss the charges against him and 
release him from custody. 
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 Because we hold that Eley is entitled to habeas relief 
on his Bruton claim, we need not reach his final claim that the 
trial judge‘s reasonable doubt jury instruction reduced the 
Commonwealth‘s burden of proof in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).  For the same reason, we do 
not decide the related questions that we directed the parties to 
brief in our certificate of appealability, namely:  (1) ―Did 
[Eley] fairly present to the state courts his due process 
challenge to the trial court‘s reasonable doubt instructions,‖ 
and (2) ―If this claim was not fairly presented, should this 
Court consider the question of procedural default even though 
it was not raised by the Commonwealth in the District Court 
proceedings or otherwise considered by the District Court?‖  
App. at 3. 
Eley v. Erikson, et al., No. 10-4725, Dissenting. 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 It is well established that, without some real evidence 
of guilt, a defendant‟s presence at—and then flight from—the 
scene of a crime are insufficient to prove his or her guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, it appears that 
never before in Anglo-American jurisprudence has any court 
decided that a rational jury could have found a defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on nothing more than 
his or her presence and flight—or otherwise concluded that 
such decision was a reasonable application of clearly 
established federal law.  Because I believe that the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s decision thereby constituted 
an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court 
precedent, I must respectfully dissent. 
 
 Like the majority, I recognize the doubly deferential 
nature of our standard of review under Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307 (1979), and AEDPA.  In Coleman v. Johnson, 
132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012) (per curiam), the Supreme Court 
recently determined that we “failed to afford due respect to 
the role of the jury and the state courts of Pennsylvania,” id. 
at 2062.  Under Jackson, “the relevant question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 
U.S. 356, 362 (1972)).  This reasonable doubt standard of 
proof requires the finder of fact “to reach a subjective state of 
near certitude of the guilt of the accused.”  Id. at 315 (citing 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)).  The Jackson Court also pointed out that “a 
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properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when 
it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 317.  In addition, the writ 
of habeas corpus—the Great Writ—still “stands as a 
safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of 
the law.”  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011).  
“Judges must be vigilant and independent in reviewing 
petitions for the writ, a commitment that entails substantial 
judicial resources.”  Id.  As the majority recognized, habeas 
relief under AEDPA still represents “„a guard against extreme 
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.‟”  
(Majority Opinion at 13-14 (quoting Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 
786).) 
 
 It is undisputed that a defendant cannot be convicted 
based solely on evidence of his or her presence at—and then 
flight from—the scene of the crime, although the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court did not expressly reference this 
fundamental principle in its own disposition of Eley‟s 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge.  “„[M]ere association 
with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere 
knowledge of the crime is insufficient‟ to establish that a 
defendant was part of a conspiratorial agreement to commit 
the crime,” and, accordingly, there must be “some additional 
proof” that the defendant intended to commit the crime 
together with his or her co-conspirators.  Commonwealth v. 
Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1238 (Pa. 2004) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2002)).  Likewise, “a defendant cannot be an accomplice 
simply based on evidence that he knew about the crime or 
was present at the crime scene.”  Id. at 1234 (citing 
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Commonwealth v. Wagaman, 627 A.2d 735, 740 (1993)); see 
also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 
1255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (noting that it is well settled that 
mere presence at scene of crime is not enough to establish 
accomplice liability).  “There must be some additional 
evidence that the defendant intended to aid in the commission 
of the underlying crime, and then did or attempted to do so.”  
Murphy, 844 A.2d at 1234 (citing Wagaman, 627 A.2d at 
740).   Flight may indicate consciousness of guilt and may be 
considered as evidence, along with other proof, supporting an 
inference of guilt.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 
A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  “Nonetheless, this only 
holds true in cases in which the other evidence of guilt 
consists of more than mere presence at the scene.”  Id. at 24.  
In the end, “„mere presence on the scene both immediately 
prior to and subsequent to the commission of a crime and 
flight therefrom is not sufficient to prove involvement in the 
crime.”  Id. at 23-24 (quoting Commonwealth v. Goodman, 
350 A.2d 810, 811-12 (Pa. 1976)). 
 
 The majority itself acknowledges that “this is a close 
case” under Jackson, going so far as to state that, “had we 
been the Superior Court, we might even have reversed his 
conviction.”  (Majority Opinion at 32.)  Ultimately, Eley‟s 
conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, and 
second-degree murder was based on nothing more than his 
presence at the scene of the crimes and his flight from the 
scene.  Applying the well-established legal principles 
summarized above, I conclude that his conviction cannot be 
allowed to stand.  In short, it was objectively unreasonable for 
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the Pennsylvania Superior Court to decide that a rational jury 
could have found Eley guilty of second-degree murder, 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This case thereby presents us with the kind 
of “extreme malfunction[] in the state criminal justice 
system[]” that federal habeas relief under AEDPA is actually 
meant to remedy.  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting 
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment)).  
 
 Focusing in particular on the conspiracy charge, the 
majority summarizes the evidence presented to the jury in 
some detail and also identifies a rather extensive range of 
inferences that a rational jury allegedly could have drawn 
from this evidence.  I observe that, in contrast, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s own discussion of Eley‟s 
sufficiency of the evidence claim was rather cursory.  For 
example, it stated, without any explanation, that “they [Eley 
and his two co-Defendants] were seen acting together when 
the victim was shot.”  (A261.)  In any case, I must reject the 
majority‟s own approach because it would have been clearly 
unreasonable for a jury to draw many of these proffered 
inferences given the evidence that was presented at trial. 
  
 For instance, the majority concluded that “a jury could 
have rationally inferred that Eley intended and agreed to rob 
DeJesus with his co-defendants” because, in turn, a rational 
jury could have inferred that:  (1) Eley was prepared to 
prevent DeJesus from fleeing based on the testimony that two 
men waited right beside the taxi while one man entered and 
two shots were fired; (2) he was ready to help in hiding the 
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murder weapon based on the testimony that he fled with his 
co-Defendants towards an abandoned house where multiple 
weapons were found; and (3) he was attempting to hide his 
guilt given his false statement to the police.  (Majority 
Opinion at 24.)  Nevertheless, I observe that none of the 
witnesses actually testified that the other two men attempted 
to block the victim‟s escape, acted as a lookout, or did 
anything else to aid or support the shooter.  As the majority 
itself notes, a mere five seconds elapsed between the second 
and third shots.  It also acknowledges “that Eley and his co-
defendants were loitering in the area of Hummel and 
Kittatinny” and “that they regularly hung out there.”  (Id. at 
25.)  Furthermore, McDonald testified that she did not see 
any weapons, and Fonseca similarly told the jury that he did 
not see the men carrying anything while they were running 
away.  There was no evidence that Eley benefited from the 
robbery itself (e.g., possession of the money stolen from 
DeJesus) or that there were any earlier encounters with, or 
threats against, DeJesus himself.  The police officers likewise 
did not find any of the co-Defendants‟ fingerprints on the 
abandoned house‟s doorknobs or the weapons they recovered 
and, more broadly, did not uncover anything else (e.g., any 
identification or pictures) connecting Eley with this building.  
I further note that Eley‟s police statement, like his flight from 
the scene, at best indicated consciousness of guilt.  Given the 
absence of any real evidence indicating that he intended and 
agreed to engage in criminal activity—or at least intended to 
aid or promote such activity and then actively participated in 
the activity itself—this statement was clearly not sufficient to 
sustain his conviction.      
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 The Supreme Court‟s recent Coleman opinion further 
highlights the objective unreasonableness of the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court‟s decision.  The majority itself acknowledges 
that “the evidence is less compelling in this case than in 
Coleman.”  (Id. at 23.)  In fact, the Coleman Court observed 
that the prisoner and his co-defendant—who “„ran the streets 
together‟”—attempted to collect a debt from the victim earlier 
on the day of the murder, the victim resisted and humiliated 
the co-defendant in public by beating him with a broomstick, 
and the enraged co-defendant repeatedly declared his intent to 
kill the victim in the prisoner‟s presence.  Coleman, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2065.  The prisoner then helped the co-defendant, who 
was noticeably concealing a bulky object under his 
trenchcoat, to escort the victim into the alley.  Id.  While the 
prisoner stood at the entryway, the co-defendant pulled out a 
shotgun and shot the victim in the chest.  Id.  As I have 
already observed, one of the witnesses at Eley‟s trial actually 
testified that she did not see any weapons.  There also was an 
absence of any evidence of either any prior encounters with—
or threats against—DeJesus or that the two men by the taxi 
acted to block his escape or otherwise assist the shooter.  
Given the circumstances, the Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s 
decision clearly constituted an objectively unreasonable 
application of Jackson. 
  
  For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the District 
Court‟s denial of Eley‟s sufficiency of the evidence claim and 
direct the District Court to order his unconditional release 
from custody with prejudice to any re-prosecution.  See, e.g., 
O‟Laughlin v. O‟Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 309 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(“Because double jeopardy principles apply here, we remand 
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to the district court to order O‟Laughlin‟s unconditional 
release with prejudice to reprosecution.” (citing Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978))).  I therefore cannot join 
the majority‟s discussion of the Confrontation Clause claim 
or its judgment remanding this case for a possible retrial. 
